


# **The Architecture of Global Stability**

## **An Exhaustive Analysis of the United Nations, Great Power Conflict, and Our Proposal for the Future of International Security**

**(Version 1.0 )**

EFOW Brief  
Adriaan Kamp/ Dr Singh  
January 2026



## Executive Preface

Since 1945, the United Nations has stood as humanity's most comprehensive attempt to prevent large-scale war through collective security, international law, and multilateral diplomacy. Anchored in the trauma of World War II, the UN system was designed to balance moral aspiration with political reality—most notably by granting special authority to the five Permanent Members of the Security Council (P5). This compromise helped avert direct conflict among nuclear powers, yet it also embedded structural limitations that continue to shape global security outcomes.

Eighty years later, the international system faces a profound legitimacy and effectiveness crisis. While the UN has succeeded in preventing a third world war, it has proven far less capable of preventing proxy conflicts, regional wars, humanitarian catastrophes, and the erosion of sovereignty norms. The growing frequency of Security Council paralysis—particularly when a permanent member is directly involved in a conflict—has weakened confidence in the UN as the central guarantor of peace.

This study offers a comprehensive analysis of:


- The historical evolution of UN peacekeeping and enforcement mechanisms
- The changing balance between hard power and soft power among the United States, China, and Russia
- The role of proxy wars and alliance systems in sustaining global instability
- The psychological and leadership dimensions that increasingly influence international conflict

Beyond diagnosis, the report advances a structural reform proposal: a decentralized global security architecture built around Regional Security Councils (RSCs), integrated with a streamlined and redefined Global Security Council. This model is grounded in the principle of subsidiarity—addressing conflicts at the most effective regional level—while preserving a global mechanism for managing systemic and existential threats.


Finally, the study argues that security in the 21st century can no longer be defined narrowly in military terms. Climate stress, energy access, economic inequality, and governance failures are now primary drivers of conflict. Drawing on the ethical framework of Pope Francis' "Diplomacy of Encounter," Jeffrey Sachs' concept of "Common Survival," and systems-based energy-security thinking articulated by Adriaan Kamp and Dr. Jagmohan Singh, the report proposes a new diplomatic doctrine and training architecture to align power, ethics, and sustainability.

The central question is no longer whether the UN should be reformed, but whether reform can occur fast enough to match the accelerating pace of geopolitical fragmentation.

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# **Chapter 1: The Genesis and Evolution of the UN Peacekeeping Architecture (1945–2025)**

## **1.1 The Founding Vision and the Security Council**

The United Nations was established in 1945 with a clear and urgent mandate: to prevent future generations from experiencing the devastation of global war. Learning from the failure of the League of Nations, the architects of the UN accepted a fundamental political reality—any effective system of collective security would require the participation and consent of the world's major military powers.

This recognition shaped the structure of the Security Council. The five victorious powers of World War II—China, France, the Soviet Union (now Russia), the United Kingdom, and the United States—were granted permanent seats and veto authority. The veto was intended not as a privilege, but as a safeguard: the UN would not take coercive action against the vital interests of a great power, thereby reducing the risk of direct confrontation among nuclear-armed states.

While this design succeeded in preventing great-power war, it also imposed severe operational constraints. During the Cold War, ideological rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union rendered the Security Council largely ineffective in conflicts involving their respective spheres of influence. Between 1946 and 1990, the veto was used nearly 200 times, often preventing action even in the face of mass violence.

Moreover, the Security Council's composition froze the geopolitical realities of 1945 into a permanent legal framework. As former colonies became independent states and new powers emerged, this imbalance generated growing dissatisfaction—particularly among countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America—fueling long-standing demands for reform.



## 1.2 The Birth of "Blue Helmets": 1948–1988

The Emergence of UN Peacekeeping: “Chapter VI and a Half”

Faced with frequent Security Council deadlock, the UN developed an innovative and pragmatic response: peacekeeping. Although not explicitly mentioned in the UN Charter, peacekeeping evolved as a flexible instrument positioned between peaceful dispute resolution (Chapter VI) and enforcement action (Chapter VII).

The evolution of peacekeeping can be understood in three phases:

### 1. Observation Missions (1948–1956)

Early missions such as UNTSO in the Middle East and UNMOGIP in Kashmir relied on unarmed military observers. Their role was limited to monitoring ceasefires and reporting violations. These missions symbolized international concern but lacked enforcement capacity and depended entirely on the consent of the parties involved.

### 2. Interposition Forces (1956–1960)

The Suez Crisis marked a turning point. When Security Council action was blocked, the General Assembly invoked the “Uniting for Peace” mechanism to establish the first armed peacekeeping force, UNEF I. This mission formalized the core principles of traditional peacekeeping: consent of the parties, impartiality, and limited use of force. UN forces physically separated combatants, creating space for diplomacy without imposing political outcomes.

### 3. The Congo Experience (1960–1964)

The UN Operation in the Congo represented the first large-scale, multidimensional mission. Operating in the context of a civil war and secessionist violence, the mission exposed the risks of peacekeeping without clear political consensus. The death of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and hundreds of peacekeepers underscored the dangers of operating in active conflict zones and foreshadowed the complex enforcement missions of later decades.

## 1.3 The Post-Cold War Surge and Retrenchment


The end of the Cold War briefly revitalized the Security Council. Between 1988 and 1994, the UN launched more peace operations than in the previous forty years combined.

### The Optimistic Phase (1990–1993)

Successful cooperation during the Gulf War and ambitious missions in Namibia and Cambodia created expectations of a new era of collective security. Multidimensional peacekeeping expanded to include elections, governance reform, and state-building.

### The Crisis Phase (1993–1999)

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


This optimism collapsed in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia. In Rwanda, inadequate mandates and political hesitation contributed to catastrophic failure. In Bosnia, the inability to protect declared “safe areas” culminated in the Srebrenica massacre. These experiences revealed the limits of traditional peacekeeping in environments where there was no genuine peace to maintain.

### **The Protection of Civilians Era (1999–Present)**

In response, the UN adopted more robust mandates focused on civilian protection. Missions such as MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo were authorized to use force proactively. While this enhanced operational capacity, it also blurred the line between peacekeeping and warfare, increasing political risk and casualties among peacekeepers.

Era	Key Characteristic	Representative Mission	Outcome
<b>1948-1956</b>	Unarmed Observation	UNTSO (Middle East)	Monitoring only; reliant on consent.
<b>1956-1988</b>	Interposition Force	UNEF I (Suez)	Buffer zones; frozen conflicts.
<b>1988-1994</b>	Multidimensional	UNTAC (Cambodia)	State-building; election oversight.
<b>1994-1999</b>	Failure of Protection	UNAMIR (Rwanda)	Genocide due to weak mandate.
<b>1999-Present</b>	Peace Enforcement	MONUSCO (DRC)	Offensive operations; PoC focus.



## Chapter 2: The P5 and the Arc of Conflict: From Proxy Wars to Direct Intervention

Although the United Nations was designed to prevent war, the post-1945 international order has been characterized by a persistent pattern of conflict driven by the major powers themselves. In practice, the UN system has functioned less as a mechanism for conflict prevention among the powerful and more as a framework for managing the consequences of their competition. This structural contradiction—often described as the P5 impunity paradox—limits the UN's ability to restrain wars involving permanent members or their vital interests.

### 2.1 The Cold War Proxies: Korea and Vietnam


**The Korean War** (1950–1953) remains the only instance in which the UN authorized a large-scale military operation against a state aligned with permanent members of the Security Council. This outcome was enabled by the temporary absence of the Soviet Union from the Council, underscoring the fragility of collective security when procedural conditions, rather than political consensus, determine outcomes. The war ended in stalemate, leaving a divided peninsula and a UN Command that technically persists to this day—illustrating the long-term institutional consequences of unresolved conflicts.

**The Vietnam War** (1955–1975), by contrast, demonstrated the limits of UN relevance. With the United States directly involved and the Soviet Union and China backing the opposing side, the Security Council was effectively sidelined. Diplomatic initiatives by the Secretary-General failed to gain traction, reinforcing the reality that superpower-defined spheres of influence lay beyond the UN's reach.

### 2.2 The Unipolar Interventions: Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya

The end of the Cold War briefly created conditions for enhanced Security Council cooperation. This period, however, also revealed new forms of unilateralism.

In Afghanistan, the Soviet invasion of 1979 was shielded by veto power, while the US-led intervention in 2001 was initially endorsed as collective self-defense. Over time, the mission evolved into a prolonged nation-building effort largely conducted under NATO leadership, exposing the limits of externally imposed governance. The rapid collapse of Afghan institutions following the 2021 withdrawal highlighted the fragility of security models detached from local political legitimacy.



The 2003 invasion of Iraq marked a decisive rupture. Proceeding without explicit Security Council authorization, the operation undermined the UN Charter's prohibition on the use of force and weakened the Council's authority as the sole legitimizing body for military intervention. This precedent reshaped global norms and contributed to the erosion of restraint among other major powers.


The 2011 intervention in Libya initially appeared to reaffirm collective responsibility, with authorization to protect civilians. However, the perception that the mandate was used to pursue regime change generated deep mistrust, particularly among Russia and China. This experience directly influenced subsequent veto behavior, notably in Syria, where consensus proved unattainable.

## **2.3 The Return of Great Power War: Ukraine and Chechnya**

The wars in Chechnya illustrated how internal conflicts within permanent-member states remain largely insulated from Security Council action. While widely criticized for human rights violations, Russia's use of overwhelming force was framed domestically as counterterrorism. The absence of Security Council engagement revealed the limits of international oversight when sovereignty and veto power intersect.

The invasion of Ukraine represents a far more profound rupture. A permanent member of the Security Council has attempted to alter borders by force, directly challenging the UN Charter's core principles. The Council's paralysis has shifted responsibility to the General Assembly, whose resolutions, though symbolically important, lack enforcement power. This conflict underscores the exhaustion of post-Cold War assumptions that economic integration alone could ensure security stability.





## Chapter 3: The Geometry of Alliances: Regional Security Pacts

Global security has never been shaped solely by the United Nations. Regional military alliances and political-security frameworks have consistently influenced conflict dynamics, often operating alongside—or in tension with—UN mechanisms.

The interplay between these "Hard Power" pacts and "Soft Power" diplomacy defines the real security landscape.

### 3.1 The Euro-Atlantic Architecture: NATO, Warsaw Pact, and OSCE

NATO's creation in 1949 institutionalized US engagement in European security and provided a collective defense structure that shaped Cold War stability. Its counterpart, the Warsaw Pact, functioned primarily as an instrument of Soviet control rather than mutual defense. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact left NATO as the dominant military alliance in Europe, contributing to a persistent Russian perception of strategic encirclement.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) emerged as a complementary, non-military framework emphasizing confidence-building, arms control, and human rights. While its influence has declined, it remains one of the few inclusive forums where dialogue between Russia and Western states continues.

### 3.2 The Rise of the Rest: SCO and BRICS

The **Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)** represents the primary non-Western security pact. Originally focused on border demilitarization and counter-terrorism ("The Three Evils"), it has evolved into a geopolitical bloc including China, Russia, India, and Pakistan. It emphasizes "sovereign democracy" and non-interference, directly challenging the Western "liberal interventionist" model. While NATO is an alliance of mutual defense, the SCO is an alliance of mutual regime security.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization reflects a different security philosophy. Focused on sovereignty, regime stability, and non-interference, it prioritizes internal security over normative intervention. Unlike NATO's mutual defense commitments, the SCO emphasizes coordination among governing elites, challenging Western models of security governance without directly replicating them.



## Chapter 4: The Pendulum of Power: Hard vs. Soft Power Across Presidencies

The effectiveness of global governance depends on how states balance between "Hard Power"(coercion) and "Soft Power"(attraction). Over time, this balance has shifted significantly among the major powers.

### 4.1 United States: The Oscillating Hegemon


US strategy has oscillated between military dominance and institutional leadership. During the Cold War, deterrence was complemented by economic reconstruction and cultural influence. The post-Cold War period emphasized multilateralism and integration, while more recent years have seen a return to transactional approaches and strategic competition. This oscillation has weakened the predictability of US leadership within global institutions.

- **Cold War Era (Truman to Reagan):** A balanced approach. Hard Power (Nuclear deterrence, Vietnam) was complemented by massive Soft Power initiatives (Marshall Plan, Peace Corps, cultural exports).
- **Post-Cold War (Clinton/Obama):** The era of "Smart Power." The US relied on international institutions and economic integration. Obama's "pivot to Asia" attempted to use trade (TPP) as a soft power containment tool against China.
- **Biden Era:** A hybrid approach. Returning to alliances (Soft Power) while engaging in a proxy war in Ukraine (Hard Power) and maintaining Trump-era tariffs (Economic Hard Power).
- **Trump 2.0 Era:** With his administration America First/NSS/New Monroe doctrine, moving away from multi-lateralism but more direct transactional based peace-making/ deal-making ("Witkoff-method"), the President has set a new tone of voice and international, diplomatic working approach.

### 4.2 China: From Charm to Wolf Warrior

China's rise initially relied on reassurance and economic diplomacy. In recent years, this approach has shifted toward assertive statecraft, combining economic leverage with ideological positioning. The integration of party and state authority has transformed China's external engagement into a more centralized and disciplined instrument of power.

- **Hu Jintao (2002-2012):** The era of "Peaceful Rise." China invested heavily in "Soft Power," establishing Confucius Institutes and emphasizing "win-win" economic cooperation. The goal was to reassure the world that China's rise was non-threatening.
- **Xi Jinping (2012-Present):** A transition to "Sharp Power" and "Wolf Warrior Diplomacy." The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) uses economic hard power to purchase political alignment. Soft power is now viewed as an ideological battlefield; the "China Model" of authoritarian development is aggressively exported. Xi has centralized control, merging the "Party-State" into a unified hard power instrument.



### 4.3 Russia: The Resentful Revisionist

Post-Soviet Russia experienced a period of strategic disorientation before embracing a revisionist posture. Viewing Western soft power as a threat rather than an opportunity, Russia has prioritized military strength, information operations, and energy leverage. The invasion of Ukraine reflects the culmination of this strategy and the abandonment of integration as a pathway to influence.

- **Yeltsin (1991-1999):** A period of forced Soft Power due to Hard Power collapse. Russia sought integration into the G7 and Western institutions but was often treated as a junior partner, breeding resentment.
- **Putin (2000-Present):** A decisive rejection of Soft Power (viewed as Western subversion). Putin relies on "Sharp Power" (disinformation, cyberwarfare) and raw Hard Power (Syria, Ukraine). His "Soft Power" is limited to the Orthodox Church and appeals to "traditional values" against Western liberalism. The invasion of Ukraine marks the ultimate failure of Russia to achieve its goals through non-military means.

Feature	US (Liberal Hegemony)	China (Party-State Realism)	Russia (Sovereign Revisionism)
<b>Dominant Power Type</b>	Combined (Oscillating)	Economic/Sharp Power	Hard/Sharp Power
<b>Key Mechanism</b>	Alliances (NATO, Quad)	Belt & Road Initiative	Military Intervention/Energy
<b>Soft Power Goal</b>	Attraction/Democracy	Respect/Non-interference	Disruption/Traditionalism
<b>View of UN</b>	Tool for Legitimacy	Arena for Global South Leadership	Great Power Veto Shield



## Chapter 5: The Psychology of Leadership: Envy and Conflict

The structural realist view of international relations often overlooks the role of individual agency.

Structural explanations alone cannot fully account for contemporary conflicts. Leadership psychology and individual agency increasingly shape international outcomes.

### 5.1 An Example: Putin, Von der Leyen, and Zelensky

Vladimir Putin's governance reflects a worldview centered on historical grievance and perceived injustice. His approach prioritizes restoring status rather than adapting to systemic change. Volodymyr Zelensky, by contrast, has effectively mobilized international opinion through personalized communication, transforming moral legitimacy into material support. Ursula von der Leyen represents a European shift from engagement toward strategic resilience, acknowledging the limits of normative power without coercive backing.

**Vladimir Putin:** Analyses suggest Putin acts from a position of "malicious envy" toward the West. Psychological studies define malicious envy as the desire to "pull down" the superior other rather than improve oneself. Putin views the EU's economic success and NATO's cohesion not as models to emulate, but as threats to be dismantled. His disdain for leaders like Ursula von der Leyen stems from a worldview that despises "weak" liberal consensus-building. His isolation during the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated this detachment, creating an echo chamber that validated his irredentist historical theories.

**Volodymyr Zelensky:** Zelensky utilized the "personalization of politics" to master the information war. By framing the conflict as a struggle between "light and dark," he mobilized Western Soft Power (public opinion) to unlock Hard Power (weapons). His background as an actor allowed him to communicate authenticity, contrasting sharply with Putin's distant authoritarianism. He serves as a "mirror" to European leaders, shaming them into action.

**Ursula von der Leyen:** Representing the EU technocratic elite, her relationship with Putin is characterized by a shift from "engagement" to "containment." She embodies the EU's realization that Soft Power alone cannot deter a revisionist state. Her rhetoric identifying Putin as a "predator" marks the end of European ambiguity. The friction between Putin and Von der Leyen represents the clash of two systems: the "Strongman" vs. the "Rules-Based Order".


### 5.2 The "Envy" Dynamic in Global Politics

When leaders perceive their diminished status as unjust, resentment can drive risk-acceptant behavior. This dynamic helps explain why economic costs or diplomatic isolation may fail to deter aggressive actions. In such contexts, conflict becomes less about material gain and more about symbolic restoration.



As an example:

Research indicates that when a nation or leader feels that their lower status is "undeserved" (as Russia feels regarding its post-Cold War decline), the resulting emotion can become "malicious envy", which predicts hostility and schadenfreude. This may explain Russia's continued willingness to incur massive economic costs in Ukraine; the primary goal is not economic gain, but the destruction of a rival, rival system (e.g. "EU/Ukraine as a successful, Western-aligned democracy").



## Chapter 6: A New Construct – Regional Security Councils and Global Reform

The concentration of authority in a single global body no longer reflects geopolitical realities. A more effective system would decentralize responsibility while preserving global coordination.

The current monolithic UN Security Council is no longer representative of the geopolitical reality.

A reformed order best to embrace **Subsidiarity**—solving problems at the most local level possible—while maintaining a global forum for existential threats. As such, we propose an ("easy-can-do") restructuring into a system of **Regional Security Councils (RSCs)**.

### 6.1 The New Regional Architecture

Regional bodies—such as strengthened ASEAN, African Union, European, Eurasian, and South Asian security councils—would assume primary responsibility for conflict prevention and management within their regions. This approach enhances legitimacy, cultural understanding, and response speed while reducing great-power obstruction.

**ASEAN Security Council:** Building on the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), this body would handle South China Sea disputes and internal conflicts (e.g., Myanmar). It operates on consensus and non-interference but would be empowered to deploy regional peacekeeping forces without waiting for New York. It would formalize the concept of "ASEAN Centrality" in Asian security.

**African Union Security Council (AU-PSC):** Already existent but underfunded. The reform would grant the AU-PSC legal primacy for African conflicts, with automatic partial funding from the UN assessed budget (expanding on Resolution 2719). This reduces P5 interference in African affairs and allows for "African solutions to African problems".


**European Security Council (EU-SC):** A formalization of the European Defence Union, handling Balkan stability and Mediterranean security independent of US vetoes. This would likely involve the UK post-Brexit, creating a new European security architecture distinct from the EU proper.

**China Inc. (East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere 2.0):** "China Inc." here refers to the Sinosphere economic block. A security council for this region would be dominated by Beijing but would include mechanisms for consultation with economic dependencies. It acts as a stabilizer for the Belt and Road states, prioritizing regime security and economic flow over human rights.

**Greater Russia (Eurasian Security Council):** Formalizing the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) into a recognized regional council. This acknowledges Russia's "sphere of influence" in Central Asia but binds it to a legal framework of consultation, theoretically reducing the impulse for unilateral invasions.

**India Inc. (South Asian Security Council):** Centered on SAARC or a new BIMSTEC-based security arrangement. This acknowledges India's role as the net security provider in the Indian Ocean Region, managing stability in Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Bangladesh.

**MENA & Latin America:** These regions face the hardest path to integration due to internal rivalries (Iran-Saudi, Brazil-Argentina). A "CELAC Security Council" for Latin America would aim to manage crises like Venezuela regionally, reducing the dominance of the US (OAS) and the interference of extra-regional actors.



## 6.2 A Reformed Global Security Council

The global Security Council would shift from direct operational control to a supervisory role, intervening only when regional mechanisms fail or when conflicts generate transregional consequences. Representation would reflect regional groupings rather than individual post-1945 power arrangements.

The Global UNSC would be restructured to represent these blocks rather than just individual nations.

- **Composition:** Representatives from the RSCs (e.g., EU, AU, ASEAN, NAFTA/US, Mercosur, SCO) plus rotating major powers (India, Brazil, Japan).
- **Mandate:** It would act as a "Supreme Court" of global security, intervening only when an RSC fails or when a conflict spills across regions. This reduces the caseload and the frequency of P5 vetoes on local issues.


## 6.3 Integrating ECOSOC and the UN SDGs/Climate Agenda

Security governance best to incorporate climate risk, (present/future/probable) resource scarcity, UN sustainable development agenda, and economic resilience. Strengthening ECOSOC and linking sustainable development commitments to peace-keeping mechanisms would reflect the realities of modern conflict drivers. Preventive deployment of environmental/ development mediation teams could reduce escalation in vulnerable regions

Security is no longer just military; it is ecological and economic.

- **ECOSOC Empowerment:** The Economic and Social Council best to be elevated to equal status with the Security Council. A "Global Development/Resilience Council" would merge ECOSOC functions with the power to support implement Common Agenda, UNSDGs/ COP climate agreements.
- **Resource Peacekeeping:** "Green Helmets"—UN Environment and Earth Resource Peacekeepers—deployed to resource-scarce regions (e.g. Sahel, Water basins) or Energy (Oil, Gas, Minerals)- to mediate conflicts before they become wars. This aligns with the "Energy for One World" vision, where energy architecture is the foundation of peace.





## Chapter 7: Operationalizing Peace – The "Witkoff Model" vs. Traditional Diplomacy

Structure alone is insufficient; the *method* of diplomacy best to evolve. Institutional reform best to be matched by procedural innovation.

Recent trends show a divergence between institutional diplomacy and personalized, transactional deal-making.

### 7.1 The "Transactional Envoy" Model (The Trump/Witkoff Method)

The appointment of real estate tycoon Steve Witkoff as a special envoy by the Trump administration represents a privatization of diplomacy. This model treats peace as a real estate deal: transactional, focused on immediate deliverables, and often bypassing traditional protocols.

- **Pros:** High speed, direct access to decision-makers, ability to cut through bureaucratic red tape. In the Ukraine context, Witkoff advised Russian officials on how to "pitch" peace deals to Trump, suggesting land swaps and specific concessions.
- **Cons:** Lack of institutional memory, risk of conflicting interests, and potential disregard for international law and human rights. It risks creating unstable peace built on personal relationships rather than institutional guarantees.
- **Synthesis:** The UN should adopt a "Pro-Active Envoy" corps—business and political heavyweights appointed by the Secretary-General with specific, time-bound mandates to close deals (e.g., a ceasefire), independent of the slow-moving UNSC machinery. This bridges the gap between the lethargy of the UN and the agility of the private sector.


The above executed diplomatic practice(s)- emphasize speed, access, and deal-making. While such approaches can produce short-term results, they lack durability without institutional anchoring. The UN should integrate time-bound, high-level envoys into its framework while preserving legal and ethical standards.

### 7.2 The Failure of Traditional Approaches

The traditional "career diplomat" approach, while stable, has often failed to prevent conflict because it relies on established norms that revisionist powers (Russia, China) no longer respect. The "Witkoff" model, for all its flaws, acknowledges the reality of a world driven by personal power and interest-based bargaining. Conventional diplomatic norms assume shared rules and mutual restraint. In an era of revisionism, these assumptions no longer hold universally. Effective diplomacy (tomorrow) best to combine principled engagement with strategic realism.

A reformed UN best to integrate this "deal-making" capability without losing its moral compass.





## Chapter 8: The New Diplomatic Cadre: A Curriculum for Encounter

To counter the transactional cynicism of the "Witkoff Model" and the paralysis of the old guard, the new cadre of diplomats best to be trained in a fundamentally different ethos. We propose a new training methodology based on the works of Pope Francis, Jeffrey Sachs, and Adriaan Kamp.

### 8.1 The "Diplomacy of Encounter" (Pope Francis)

Sustainable peace requires a new professional culture.

Diplomacy best to prioritize dialogue grounded in human dignity, recognizing shared vulnerability rather than moral superiority. This approach seeks de-escalation without legitimizing aggression.

Diplomacy best to move from "confrontation/ self-interest" to "encounter/ shared-interest." This involves:

- **The Logic of Encounter:** Rejecting the "culture of waste" and the demonization of the enemy. It requires acknowledging the humanity of the adversary and the "diplomacy of forgiveness."
- **Practical Application:** In Ukraine or Gaza, this means prioritizing the immediate cessation of suffering over geopolitical scoring. It rejects the Manichaean "Good vs. Evil" narrative that fuels endless wars, focusing instead on the shared vulnerability of all parties.

### 8.2 Common Survival (Jeffrey Sachs)

In a multipolar world, peace depends on shared economic and ecological survival. Development, equity, and sustainability are no longer peripheral but central to security.

Diplomacy best to reject "Exceptionalism."

- **De-Westernization:** US and European diplomats best to be trained to accept a multipolar world where they are peers, not teachers. The narrative of "Western moral superiority" often blinds diplomats to the legitimate grievances of other powers (e.g., Russia's security concerns regarding NATO expansion).
- **Sustainable Development as Peace:** The focus best to shift from military dominance to "common survival" via the SDGs. Peace is impossible without economic justice.

### 8.3 Energy Architecture (Adriaan Kamp, Dr Singh)

Energy access underpins stability. Diplomats must understand infrastructure, interdependence, and sustainability as instruments of peace, not merely technical domains.



Diplomacy best to be systems-based. Peace cannot exist without energy equity.

- **The Energy Architect:** The new diplomat best to understand that (sustainable, affordable and available) energy access is presently the hardest (physical) currency of soft power.<sup>1</sup>
- **Interdependence:** The "Energy for One World" framework proposes that (REGIONAL) shared energy-economies and infrastructure can help create interdependencies that make war economically irrational. This is the "Hard Wiring" of peace<sup>2</sup>.

## 8.4 Proposal: The UN Global Peace Academy

We propose the creation of a **UN Global Peace Academy**, for all RSC and UNSC envoys.

This training institution would integrate strategic realism, systems thinking, and ethical negotiation, producing diplomats capable of operating in complex, high-stakes environments.


The curriculum would fuse:

1. **Hard Power Realism:** Understanding military balances and red lines (Mearsheimer/Kissinger).
2. **Energy-Economy-Ecological (Sustainable development) Systems Thinking:** The EFOW model.
3. **Ethical Mediation:** The Francis/Sachs/Kamp model of dignity-based negotiation.

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<sup>1</sup> This Century Quest and Scramble for Earth Resources


<sup>2</sup> EU model - as example.



## Conclusion


The United Nations has succeeded in preventing global catastrophe but has struggled to manage persistent regional conflict and great-power rivalry. The challenge is not to abandon multilateralism, but to redesign it. A decentralized security architecture, grounded in regional responsibility and global coordination, offers a viable path forward. Whether the international community can adapt quickly enough remains the defining question of the 21st century.

The solution lies not in abandoning the UN, but in ("an easy-can-do") decentralizing it to Regional Security Councils while elevating the "Soft Power" of energy, economy development and climate cooperation to "a new diplomatic normal" By combining the deal-making speed of the "Envoy Model" with the ethical depth of the "Diplomacy of Encounter," we may construct a peace architecture that survives the 21st century. We are learning, but slowly. The question remains whether we can learn faster than we can destroy.




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


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